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OUELLETE v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.:
FOLLOWING THE PAST, IMPROVING
FOR THE FUTURE
Pollution of our nation's water poses a great threat to the interests of
government, industry, and the public.1 Although federal legislation
such as the Clean Water Act2 is the primary means to eradicate water
pollution, courts also play an instrumental role in the fight for cleaner
water.' In cases of interstate pollution, courts frequently face the diffi-
cult problem of how to redress injury to an affected state4 and still
maintain a comprehensive, uniform system of federal pollution regula-
tion.5 In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette6 the United States
1. A senate committee found that "many of the Nation's navigable waters [were]
severely polluted, and major waterways near the individual and urban areas [were] unfit
for most purposes." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1972). The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits the discharge of water pollutants
into navigable waters without a permit issued by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). The Act sets federal minimum standards of water quality, permitting source
states to make their standards even more stringent. Congress stated the goals of this
legislation as "restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1972). Congress stated the Act's goal
in § 1251(a)(1): "mhe discharge of pollutants into navigable waters [shall] be elimi-
nated by 1985." lId
3. See generally U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1986) (dis-
charge of dredged fill materials allowed only by permit); Quivira Min. Co. v. United
States E.P.A., 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1985) (CWA in-
tended to protect as much water as possible); U.S. v. Ottati and Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (discharge of waste chemicals into navigable water without permit
violated CWA).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1972) (describing the rights and powers of an affected state
under the CWA permit system (NPDES)). The United States Supreme Court in Inter-
national Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987) indicated that "affected" states
are those "that share an interstate waterway with the source." lId at 810. A "source'
state is the point of pollution discharge. lId at 808. The CWA defines a "point source"
as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... from which pollutants are or
may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Difficulty arises in this situation because under the CWA
guidelines, a source state may only impose more stringent discharge requirements than
those mandated by the Act. An affected state may issue only an advisory opinion at the
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Supreme Court held that although the Clean Water Act (CWA)
preempts the imposition of Vermont nuisance law on a New York pol-
lution source, the Act allows the affected state to pursue an interstate
water pollution claim in its own courts applying the source state's law.'
In Ouellette, Vermont landowners filed a class action against Inter-
national Paper Company (IPC), a New York paper mill, claiming that
IPC discharged pollutants into a shared border lake, thus polluting
Vermont waters and creating a nuisance under Vermont common law.'
The plaintiff landowners alleged that the pollution decreased their
property value and prevented use of the lake for recreational purposes.9
The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damager and an in-
junction requiring restructure of IPC's water treatment system.10 The
United States District Court for the District of Vermont11 ruled that
the CWA's saving clause12 did not allow complete federal preemption;
consequently, the court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their claim
time of the permit's issuance to the source-state company. An affected state may not
use its own law against a point source in another state because such a legal imposition
would usurp Congress' desire for a uniform, comprehensive federal system. Id.
6. 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
7. Id. at 816. The Court found that the claimants' residence in another state should
not completely bar recovery. Therefore, claimants were allowed to sue in Vermont
courts using the law of New York, the location of the point source. Id.
8. Id. at 807. IPC argued that its New York-issued permit required only that it
comply with New York pollution standards, not those of Vermont. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id The landowners also sought monetary and injunctive relief for air pollution
allegedly emitted by the mill. Id
11. The defendant removed the action from Vermont Superior Court to the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont. Id
12. The "saving clause" consists of two provisions in the Clean Water Act which
preserve state action in cases of interstate water pollution. Section 510 of the Act states:
"[e]xcept as expressly provided .... nothing in this chapter shall ... be construed as
impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect
to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States." 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1972).
See State of Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198, 1208 (8th Cir. 1976) (section 1370
ensures that states may adopt more stringent standards than those required by the Act).
Section 505(e) states: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. .. ." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(1972).
The district court interpreted the savings clause to mean that a state may use its law if
it was the site of the actual injury. 107 S. Ct. at 809.
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against the New York paper mill using Vermont common law.1 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, adopt-
ing the opinion of the District Court.14 On writ of certiorari, "5 the
Supreme Court affirmed in part, 16 reversed in part, and remanded the
case. The Court held that in an interstate water pollution claim subject
to the CWA, the court of an affected state may only utilize the source
state's law, but may hear the case in its own courts.1 7
In 1948, Congress passed the original Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (FWPCA)1 This statute allowed the federal government to
comprehensively regulate the nation's water. 9 Further, the Act al-
lowed courts to supplement and possibly preempt federal common law
in cases of interstate water pollution. 0
In 1971, the Supreme Court first contemplated applying a state com-
mon law remedy to an interstate water pollution case. 1 In Texas v.
13. 602 F. Supp. 163, 174 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S.
Ct. 805 (1987).
14. 776 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
15. 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
16. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 807 (1987). The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of IPC's motion for summary judgment,
which claimed that the Clean Water Act preempted the landowners' state law suit. Id.
17. Id. at 809.
18. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. The Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Acts of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (known as the CWA) supercedes the
1948 Act.
19. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 104-06 (1972)
(recognition of interstate water pollution as a federal question demanding federal
regulation).
20. Before 1938, federal courts derived their greatest power to control interstate
water pollution through federal common law. See Note, Preemption of Federal Com-
mon Law-City of Milwaukee Y. Illinois, 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 201, 201-02 (1981) [here-
inafter Note]. In 1938, federal common law involved any cases decided by a federal
court which did not apply state law. Id. In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) the Supreme Court stated that federal courts may only derive common law
power from the states. Erie, however, did not completely abolish federal common law.
In Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 111 (1938), the
Court held that in cases involving interstate water, federal common law could be ap-
plied. Thus, federal common law applied only in narrow and specialized cases. Federal
common law still existed at the time of the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
See Note, State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control Statutes: Can They
Work Together?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 609, 635 (1986).
21. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 499 (1971), the Supreme
Court's dicta suggests that a court may use state nuisance law to decide an interstate
pollution case involving a state and a private company.
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Pankey,22 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
applied federal common law rather than state law. In Pankey, Texas
residents sought to enjoin New Mexico pesticide manufacturers from
dumping chemicals that eventually leaked into the plaintiffs' water sup-
ply.23 The court held that a state can protect its waters from out-of-
state polluters only by using the federal common law of nuisance,24
unless a federal statute preempted the common law.25
One year later, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1),26 the
U.S. Supreme Court applied federal rather than state common law to
an interstate water pollution case. The State of Illinois alleged that the
dumping of raw and maltreated sewage into Lake Michigan violated
Illinois water pollution standards and created a common law nui-
sance.2 7 The Supreme Court ruled that federal rather than state com-
mon law governs interstate nuisance and pollution actions.28 The
Court did not perceive a conflict between the federal common law and
the CWA.29 The Court noted two possible consequences of the hold-
ing. First, a federal statute may eventually preempt the federal com-
mon law of nuisance in interstate water pollution cases.30 Second,
22. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
23. Id at 237.
24. Id. at 240. The Court relied on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907). In that case the Supreme Court prohibited further sulfuric emissions from a
Tennessee copper smelting plant which resulted in the pollution of Georgia airspace.
25. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (1971). Circuit Judge Harvey M. Johnson
gave the court's rationale:
As the field of federal common law has been given necessary expansion into mat-
ters of federal concern and relationship (where no applicable federal statute exists,
as there does not here), the ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment
of them from sources outside the State's own territory, now would and should, we
think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal common law and
so directly constituting a question arising under the laws of the United States.
Id.
26. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
27. Id at 93. The State of Illinois also sought to enjoin four other Wisconsin cities
and a Wisconsin sewage treatment plant from further dumping. Id.
28. The Supreme Court stated: "When we deal with air and water in their ambient
or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law, as Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,
recently held." 406 U.S. at 103.
29. Id at 104. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979) (following Milwaukee I, which held that the CWA did not preempt
existing federal common law).
30. 406 U.S. at 107. The Supreme Court stated:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-
empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass,
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controversies may arise when one state seeks to uphold its more strin-
gent water quality standards against a state with less demanding
requirements. 31
The Court's prediction of preemption became reality when Congress
extensively amended the Clean Water Act in 197232 to eliminate the
deficiencies of past legislation.33 Congress imposed more explicit efflu-
ent discharge standards34 and created the National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) to regulate pollution discharge
through a federal permit system, subject to source state approval.35
The NPDES resulted in a "regulatory partnership"36 between the
source state and the federal government.37
federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging crea-
tion of a nuisance by water pollution.
IL
31. Id at 107-08. The Court exposed the deficiencies in existing interstate water
pollution law when it stated:
A state with high water quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be
honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading stan-
dards of its neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern; these will be equity
suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.
32. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, §§ 101-516. Congress
passed the amendments just five months after the Milwaukee I decision. See Note,
supra note 20, at 206-09.
33. See 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972 1425 [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIsT.]. Congress stated that
"[tlhe national effort to abate and control water pollution has been inadequate in every
vital aspect.... ." Id. The Committee on Public Works found: 1) many of the country's
navigable waters were unfit for almost any purpose; 2) rivers were the major sources of
ocean pollution, and 3) lakes and other contained waterways aged significantly due to
this pollution. Id
34. Possible violation of effluent limitations are now measured at the site, or point
source, of the pollution discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (1972). The 1972 amendment
defines an effluent limitation as "any restriction established by a State or Administrator
on quantities... and concentrations of chemical[s] ... which are discharged from point
sources into navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1972).
35. See E.P.A. v. California ex reL State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S.
200, 205-08 (1976). NPDES permits are first secured through the EPA, but states may
issue their own NPDES permits subject to EPA approval. To receive approval, a state
program must comply with the EPA's pollution guidelines and be supported by ade-
quate authority which proves that the program will achieve the desired anti-pollution
ends. Id.
36. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 810 (1987). See infra note
37 for explanation of "regulatory partnership."
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1972). Federal issuance of an NPDES permit hinges on
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Nine years after Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court conclusively pro-
claimed the CWA to be the preeminent authority in interstate water
pollution. 8 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I1)"9 the
Supreme Court found that Congress intended the CWA to fully encom-
pass all federal regulation of water pollution, thus preempting the fed-
eral common law.' To find preemption,41 the Court relied on the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments,42 the existence of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA),4 3 and the comprehensiveness of
the regulatory scheme.'
While dispensing with federal common law, the Milwaukee II Court
refused to address whether the CWA preempts state common law ac-
tions.45 However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals answered this
the source state's approval. A state may deny a permit to any applicant failing to meet
state water pollution standards. A
38. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11), 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981). The
Court stated: "Congress' intent in enacting the Amendments was clearly to establish an
all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation." Id.
39. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
40. Id. at 317. But see Hunt, Unifonnity is the Solution to Water Pollution, 23 S.
TEx. L.J. 417, 438-39 (1982) (federal common law may supplement the CWA when
legislation fails to fully address the pollution controversy).
41. Id at 319. Specifically, the Court stated:
The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program, which cer-
tainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that
there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal
common law.
Id.
Milwaukee IIs emasculation of federal common law spread to other areas of environ-
mental law. See United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (Clean
Air Act preempted federal common law of nuisance); Connecticut v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 535 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Clean Air Act displaced federal com-
mon law).
42. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318. In particular, the Court cited statements of
Representative Mizell and Senator Randolph, who described the Amendments as "the
most comprehensive and far-reaching water pollution legislation which we have ever
drafted." Id. (citing 1 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 95, 1 LuG. HisT. at 369).
Senator Randolph stated: "It is perhaps the most comprehensive legislation that the
Congress of the United States has ever developed in this particular field of the environ-
ment." Id. (citing 2 LEG. HiT. at 1269). Generally, the Court stated that these views
of the legislation were almost universal. Id.
43. Id. at 325 (Court deference to agency expertise).
44. Id. at 316-19 (establishment of a far-reaching regulatory system with specific
pollution standards precludes Court's interpretations).
45. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 312. In addition to the question of federal common
law preemption, Illinois presented the Supreme Court with the question whether the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/16
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION
question affirmatively in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee
111).46 The court held that in cases of interstate water pollution, the
CWA precluded the use of an affected state's law to determine the
source state's liability.4 7 The court rejected the argument that Illinois
common law, rather than the law of the source state, must apply be-
cause the Clean Water Act supplanted federal common law.48 The
court reasoned that the structure of the Clean Water Act, which em-
phasizes the role of the source state, and the potential for conflict and
confusion in applying the affected state's law, precluded the use of Illi-
nois' more stringent water pollution standards.49 The court noted,
however, that the affected state may pursue its claim in its own state
courts if the court applied the source state's law.50
In State v. Champion International Corp.51 the Supreme Court of
Tennessee followed the basic principles stated in Milwaukee III,52 but
deviated from the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that a claim could be
pursued in the affected state's courts.5 3 The Champion court held that
an affected state has no state or federal cause of action against a paper
mill possessing a source state's permit which complies with the Clean
Water Act.54 Although the court expressed sympathy for the plight of
CWA preempted relief under state common law. The Court later refused to address the
state common law preemption issue in a separate denial of certiorari. 451 U.S. 982
(1981).
46. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). On remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh
Circuit consolidated Milwaukee 11 with two cases containing similar facts involving
Illinois' common law nuisance claims against Indiana polluters. See Illinois v. Sanitary
District of Hammond and Scott v. City of Hammond, 519 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(interstate water pollution cases brought by the State of Illinois and an Illinois resident
against an Indiana city and its municipal corporation).
47. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
48. Wisconsin was the source state in this case. Id. at 406-07.
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id. at 414.
51. 708 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1986). In Champion, the State of Tennessee and its
environmental officials sought an injunction and civil penalties against a North Carolina
paper mill. The state claimed that the North Carolina mill impermissibly polluted a
river which flowed into Tennessee. IM. at 570.
52. Id. at 575 (advocating the need for a comprehensive federal system of water
pollution regulation). See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir.
1984).
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (an affected state may use its own
courts when applying source state law).
54. Id. at 575. The court believed that the state should honor its membership in a
national program such as the NPDES. Id.
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the affected state, 5 it believed that the opportunity for the affected
state's input prior to permit issuance,56 coupled with the need for fed-
eral regulatory uniformity, justified barring the affected state's action.5 7
In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette"' the Supreme Court devel-
oped the principles established in Milwaukee II and Milwaukee 1."
Writing for the majority,6" Justice Powell stated that a federal statute
can generally preempt state law only when preemptive intent is clear
and the state law impedes the objectives of Congress.61 The Court then
enumerated specific reasons for preempting Vermont common law.62
First, because Vermont only had common law jurisdiction over dis-
charges from within the state,6" the Act's plain language did not allow
the application of Vermont law to a New York point source, despite
the Act's saving clause. 64 Second, the Court concluded that Congress
could not have envisioned a saving clause that allowed an affected state
to circumvent the comprehensive federal regulatory system and impose
its own law upon an out-of-state point source.65
The Court next examined the goals and policies of the CWA. 66 Jus-
55. L
56. The CWA allowed an affected state to make recommendations and objections
while the source state considered issuing a CWA permit. See supra note 4 (rights of an
affected state in the NPDES permit system). The Champion court believed that this
input opportunity was sufficient to preclude later action by an affected state. Champion,
709 S.W.2d at 576.
57. Id. at 576.
58. 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
59. Id. at 811. See supra notes 39-44, 46-50 and accompanying text.
60. Four justices dissented in Ouellette. Of those dissenting, Justices Stevens and
Blackmun believed that the question of whether to use Vermont law against a New
York polluter was moot because the district court never decided which state's substan-
tive law governs the suit. 107 S. Ct. at 820-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 811. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 51, 67 (1941). See also supra note
2, regarding the objectives of the Clean Water Act.
62. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 812-15. These reasons included the plain language of the
Act, desired uniformity of the permit system, and the presence of a remedy under
source-state law.
63. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 812. The Court cites § 510 of the Act, which maintains
state authority with respect to the waters, including boundary waters, of the state. The
Court argued that the language presumably limits state jurisdiction to discharges made
within the state. Id
64. See supra note 12, regarding the content and use of the saving clause.
65. Id
66. Id at 812-14 (restoring and maintaining chemical, physical and biological bal-
ance of national waters).
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tice Powell found that imposing an affected state's law on an out-of-
state company would circumvent the CWA by enabling the affected
state to indirectly govern the source state.6 7 The Court found that this
was contrary to Congress' intent.6" Further, the Court stated that ap-
plying the affected state's law to an out-of-state source would adversely
affect the efficiency and uniformity of the permit system by potentially
subjecting a pollution source to the laws of several different states.69
The Court also reasoned that the vagueness of state common law
would turn to chaos a once orderly and specifically standardized sys-
tem.7 ° Finally, the majority found that precluding the application of
an affected state's law will not leave the affected state without a rem-
edy.7 The Court held that applying the source state's law in the af-
fected state's court72 allows redress of the affected state's injuries, while
simultaneously preserving the predictability7 3 and balance7 4 which
Congress intended.7 5 In this way, courts can equitably resolve the
claims of all parties involved.7 6
67. Id. at 813. The Court stated that if Vermont law regulated a New York point
source, the New York company would be forced to change its business practices and
pollution control methods to avoid punishment by an affected state. Id. The result, the
Court concluded, would be an affected state regulating another state's point source
without the standards and requirements established by the CWA. Id.
68. Id at 814 (use of affected state law would destroy the uniformity which Con-
gress envisioned).
69. L In a footnote, the Court illustrated the dangers in applying affected state
common law. For example, a Minnesota source on the Mississippi River could theoreti-
cally be subject to the common law of nine separate states. Id.
70. Id. at 814. The Court, citing Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984),
expressed reservations about using such vague common law claims as "nuisance' in a
system which promulgated very specific, exacting minimum pollution standards. The
addition of state common law, the Court concluded, would be the very antithesis of
Congress' objectives in enacting the CWA. Applying state law would result in a return
to the same vague, indeterminate water pollution regulation standards that Congress
sought to eliminate through the CWA. Id.
71. Id. The Court concluded that the saving clause allowed affected residents a
remedy using source state law. Id
72. This allowance demonstrates how Ouellette built upon the dictum of Milwaukee
III. Residents of affected states may now use source state law in affected state courts to
pursue their claim against another state's point source. Id at 816.
73. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (limitations on the use of affected state
law under the CWA).
74. See supra note 35 and accompanying text regarding the partnership which Con-
gress intended to exist between the state and federal governments.
75. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 815.
76. Id at 816. The Court stated: "We find no basis for holding that Vermont is an
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While the dissent77 agreed that the CWA does not preempt an inter-
state water pollution suit filed by an affected state,78 Justice Brennan
argued that the affected state's law should be applied against the New
York industry for four reasons.79 First, because the Act did not explic-
itly preempt state common law,80 preemption could not be inferred."
Second, Justice Brennan cited evidence in the legislative history that
Congress did not intend the CWA to be the exclusive remedy for water
pollution damage.82 Third, affected state law should be applied be-
cause it had the same primary purpose as the CWA- eliminating water
pollution.83 Finally, Justice Brennan stated that Vermont law validly
supplemented the CWA because the state's standards were more strin-
gent than those in the Act."4 Thus the dissent, characterizing this as a
conflict of laws case, decided in favor of Vermont, the situs of the ac-
tual injury.85
The Ouellette decision adds to the existing principles of Milwaukee
111.86 The Court's holding allows interstate water pollution claims to
be heard in the hospitable confines of the affected state's court while
improper forum. Simply because a cause of action is preempted does not mean that
judicial jurisdiction over the claim is affected as well; the Act preempts laws, not
courts." ra
77. See supra note 60.
78. 107 S. Ct. at 817 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id at 818-19.
80. Both the majority and dissent cite almost identical language in the Act, but
interpret it differently. The majority restricted allowable state common law remedies to
those of the source state. Id. at 812 n.13. The dissent drew no such distinction, inter-
preting common law remedies to mean those of either source or affected states. Id. at
818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 818 (Congress wanted to preserve the traditional right of a state to use its
own law when one of its residents is injured by an out-of-state polluter).
82. See S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3246 (stating that compliance with the CWA would not be a
defense to a suit for pollution damages brought under common law).
83. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on the
Supreme Court's holding in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Conserva-
tion and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 221-23 (1983).
84. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded
that a state law would conflict with existing federal legislation only if it imposed compli-
ance standards less stringent than the CWA. Id.
85. Id. at 820. The dissent, viewing the issue as one of conflict of laws, believed that
Vermont law should apply becaue the injury occurred in Vermont. Id.
86. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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still applying the source state's law. 7 uellette maintains the uniform
system of regulation envisioned by Congress 8 and allows an affected
state to receive compensation for damages incurred from an out-of-
state polluter.8 9 The Court's holding provides the most equitable solu-
tion for both affected and source states by broadly reading the CWA.9
Though greater state action would aid in eliminating water pollution,
the resulting state power and regulatory chaos would contradict Con-
gress' original intention to create a comprehensive federal regulatory
system. 
9 1
Ouellette reaffirms Congress' desire for uniformity and predictability
under the CWA. By reversing the second circuit's holding that an af-
fected state may use its own common law in an interstate water pollu-
tion action, the Court preserved the CWA's continuity while avoiding a
harsh result.9 2 The Supreme Court's preservation of a uniform water
pollution regulatory scheme assures industries and affected parties a
just forum and predictable regulations for adjudication of interstate
water pollution actions.
Keith W. Bartz
87. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 815.
88. See supra notes 38 and 41.
89. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90, See Note, State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control Statutes:
Can They Work Together?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 609, 638-40 (1986) (CWA displaces
federal but not state common law).
91. See supra note 41.
92. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing the result in
Champion).
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